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The problem of the functional structures research is considered in this example of information systems.
A feature of such research is that it is not always possible to ensure that the research results will match
reality. This is a topic of current interest in the field of design and analysis of information security
systems and software analysis for undeclared capabilities of systems in general. By undeclared capabilities,
we refer to a functionality available in software that is invisible to users and can be used / exploited by
an intruder. This paper presents a model of a researcher and of a functional object investigated by him.
Based on this model, informational limitations of the researcher are shown. The mathematical model of
the subjective structure of an investigated system is constructed. It is shown in which cases this structure
is stable. This article answers the question of if the researcher can claim that his subjective functional
structure corresponds to the actual structure of the investigated system. We provide examples of such
approach on certain mathematical models of information security.
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Introduction
Information management in the sense of the knowledge of structure of a system and its vul-
nerabilities is an important issue in the field of information security. Eﬀectiveness of information
security actions depends on the information that a security administrator has. More precisely,
it depends on how his information coincides with the reality. On the other hand, eﬀectiveness of
information security depends on a potential intruder’s knowledge about the system: how close
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his knowledge is to the real picture. There is a huge amount of information management tools
which can be used in this case: logging systems, testing systems, security simulation systems,
fake objects such as Honeypots, etc. However, at the present moment there are no modeling
tools for such kind of systems.
For the modeling of such systems, it is necessary to split all the information on the system
into an objective one and a subjective one. The level of similarity between a subjective image
and the real structure of the system depends on the objects in the system to which the subject
has an access and from which he can get a response. Under certain circumstances this level of
similarity can dramatically aﬀect the security of a system.
In the present article we propose one of the possible solutions to this problem.
1. Review of the relevant literature
Let us outline the main existing directions in the field of researching how of the attacker’s
information is influenced and managed. The most well-known direction is obfuscation. The most
commonly used concept of obfuscation refers to software source code. The concepts that are used
less commonly refer to software architecture and hardware devices. We may refer the reader to
the works [1–3] where the mentioned concepts are studied.
The main idea of such concepts is obfuscation of a source code or a system structure in
such way that the decoding task becomes a non-trivial problem. The key diﬀerence between the
obfuscation theory and the theory used in the present work is that in the obfuscation theory
the attacker knows about unknown parts of the system and therefore he is able to formulate the
problem of investigating the real system structure. In our situation, the attacker does not have
any information about the real system structure so that he is unable to formulate the problem
of obtaining such a structure.
As a basis for the present work we used the existing mathematical models of access control.
The most common examples of such models would be the Harrison, Ruzzo, Ullman (HRU)
Model [4], the Bell-LaPadula Model [5], the Model of Secure Information Flow [6], the Role-
based Access Control Models [7]. The HRU Model can be considered as the most universal
(but at the same time the least usable) since the current access status in any system can always
be represented as a matrix. For improving usability, a few modifications of the HRU model
were introduced, namely the Typed Access Matrix Model [8], the Dynamic-Typed Access Matrix
Model [9], etc. However, these models do not take into account the structure of the information
system participants’ awareness.
An exception here is the Quantitative Information Flow approach that became popular re-
cently (see [10–12]). In these works, the concept of information flow is considered in terms of the
Shannon entropy. Article [12] is the most interesting for us since the notion of information flow is
expressed by considering the beliefs of individual users receiving this information flow. In other
words, the information flows are considered in terms of the participants’ awareness of the system.
The related concepts of misinformation and covert channels are considered as well. Despite the
fact that in this work we study similar processes, our approach is completely diﬀerent as we only
use qualitative characteristics of information flows.
As a basis for our research, we take the HRU Model with added awareness of all participants.
The approach described in the present work can be applied without loss of generalty to various
access control models including information flow modes.
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2. Functional system model
Most information systems can be modeled using the black box model with input parameters
which one can aﬀect and output parameters which one can observe. We will treat a system
structure as transformation laws that convert input parameters into output result. A black
box structure can be represented as a set of elementary black boxes with inputs, outputs and
connections between some of them. The output of each box functionally depends on its inputs.
We call such a system of interacting black boxes a functional system.
One can make assumptions about the functional structure of the system. However, it is possi-
ble to control only a finite number of inputs and outputs. Parameter types (discrete, continuous,
etc.) will also aﬀect the result of the system research.
Consider the scheme given on Fig. 1.
Fig. 1. Information flows structure
In this case, researcher made an assumption about the black box structure. Namely he
assumes the box consists of three objects, each of which represents a functional box, consisting
of inputs and outputs. Object o1 can be normalized by splitting it into the two independent
objects with input x and outputs k and w.
The functions of system objects are
k(x); w(x); e(k; y); f(w; e):
The resulting function of the system is
f

w(x); e
 
k(x)

; y

:
Here x and y are input parameters of the system. Parameter y is considered but not observed
by the researcher.
Since the system has input parameters which are unobservable, the researcher cannot obtain
an informative feedback from the investigated system. However, it could be still possible to learn
something new about the system [13]. There could be some information on the topology of the
system and on the properties of the information flows.
It is necessary to split the subjective and the objective view of the system for determining
the conditions under which the informative feedback exists. To do this, one has to divide the
view of the objects into subjective (which might not be real) and objective, and the information
flows between those objects.
Thus, we get the subjective and the objective sche-me of the information flows (Fig. 2).
In the scheme shown on Fig. 2, the object o2 has an extra input y in the objective system
while the subjective scheme does not have it. Will the researcher get an informative feedback
from the system? It depends on the properties of the functions and on the topology of information
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flows network. Based on the properties of the researcher model described in [13], we can get an
informative feedback from the system when we are able to introduce an equivalence relation on
the set of values of the function, observed by the researcher based on unknown input parameters.
Fig. 2. Subjective and objective schemes of information flows
For the scheme mentioned above, these values will be
Fo2 : KY ! E1 E2;
so that the function may be written down as a direct product
FKo2 : K! E1;
FYo2 : Y ! E2;
Fo2 = F
K
o2  FYo2 :
One can introduce an equivalence relation on the range (set of values) of Fo2 by the formula
Fo2 : E1 E2 ! E1 E2;
8e1 2 E1; e2 2 E2; e3 2 E2 ) (e1; e2) = (e1; e3):
Furthermore, if the object o3 performs similar mappings then it is possible to define an
equivalence relation on the set of values of the function observed by the researcher. That is, the
researcher gets the function with values which can be split into two sets. One of these sets can
be indistinguishable i.e. not within the scope of the functional visibility of the subject (Fig. 3).
Fig. 3. Orthogonal information flows
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We call such information flows orthogonal since they have diﬀerent domains of parameters
and functions. It is always possible to separate orthogonal information flows by introducing
duplicating objects. As a result we get a system with non-orthogonal flows (Fig. 4).
Fig. 4. A separation of orthogonal flows
In the resulting system, the researcher can get an accurate informative feedback on the top
part of the information flows scheme. At the same time he cannot observe functional response
of the bottom part. This is due to the proposition proven in [14]. It states that the subject can
always compare the simpler model to the actual system and verify its validity by limiting the set
of the functional visibility.
From now on we consider that all the flows in the system are non-orthogonal. Consider the
situation described on Fig. 2. In this case, information flows can be iterative and noniterative.
By a noniterative system, we mean the system in which the information flows exist continuously
changing the values of the inputs of the black boxes. Any uncontrolled input in a noniterative
system leads to the situation where we can never get informative feedback.
For an iterative system, we assume that the values of one or more inputs of an object stay
the same for multiple experiments. Thus we can get an informative feedback from the other
information flows.
Most technical and information systems are iterative. It is possible to investigate their struc-
ture even without having knowledge of the values of all the inputs. There are two key issues that
are important from the practical point of view in the research of such structures:
 Which subjective schemes are stable for the resear-cher?
 What information can one obtain from the objective scheme based on the knowledge of the
subjective scheme? How do these schemes correspond to each other?
To answer these questions, it is necessary to formalize the system in such a way that it
becomes clear how the subject can adjust its assumptions on the real system structure based on
the informative feedback of the system. Since the results of this study cannot be predicted, it is
important for us to describe the maximal information of the real system structure that can be
obtained from the incoming and outgoing information in the model.
3. The mathematical formulation of the problem
3.1. Definition of objective and subjective graph
A scheme with a given topology will be identified with a directed graph. A vertex of the
graph corresponds to an object in the scheme. A directed edge corresponds to the direction of
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information flow in the scheme. Note that we can consider edges with the same two vertices and
opposite directions. We associate a graph with one vertex distinguished from all others with the
scheme that has the subject (the researcher). This is the so-called selected vertex.
Thus, we consider directed graphs of the following form
  = fV;Eg;
where
V = fV0; V1; : : : ; Vkg
is a set of vertices containing the selected vertex V0, and
E = fE1; : : : ; Emg; Ei = Ei1i2 = (Vi1 ; Vi2);
i1 2 f0; 1; : : : ; kg; i2 2 f0; 1; : : : ; kg n fi1g
is a set of ordered pairs of vertices from V , called directed edges or just simply edges.
To the objective (real) scheme we assign the graph, which we call by objective graph or etalon
graph. Graph that corresponds to the subjective scheme is called subjective graph.
3.2. Transformations of graphs
While investigating real structure of a scheme the researcher can remove certain information
flows between objects that do not exist in reality (objective scheme) or add existing but previously
unknown information flows. After a finite number of actions the researcher will come to the
situation where he will be unable to remove or add anything new to a scheme (the scheme is
stable). We call such a process of modification of a scheme when investigating its real structure
a scheme reduction. The stable scheme that one obtains after the described process has been
completed is called reduced subjective scheme or just reduced scheme.
In terms of mathematical language, we refer to the rules of addition and removal of informa-
tion flows as graph transformations. Note that such transformations are irreversible.
By stable graph we refer to the graph that corresponds to a stable scheme. We refer to the
reduced graph denoted by b  as a stable graph obtained from graph   using graph transformations.
3.3. The formulation of the problem in a general form
Consider the objective graph  o = fV o; Eog and the subjective graph  s = fV s; Esg such
that
V o0 = V
s
0 = V0; V
o \ V s 6= ; and Eo \ Es 6= ;:
The question is how similar objective graph  o and reduced (subjective) graph c s can be?
4. Graph transformation rules
Note that in the case of a disconnected graph it makes sense to only consider the connected
component containing the selected vertex V0. Indeed if the researcher has no connection to some
part of a scheme, then in no way can he get information about objects from that part. Therefore,
without loss of generality, we only consider connected graphs.
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Definition 1. By a selected subgraph of graph   we call subgraph of   whose set of vertices VI
contains the selected vertex V0 and whose set of edges contains all the edges of   whose heads
and tails belong simultaneously to VI .
Rule 1. Any selected subgraph not containing cycles is stable.
This typically corresponds to the situation where the researcher either cannot act on the
object, or he has no feedback from the object. In this case, he cannot receive any new information
about the objects, and therefore, he cannot add or remove information flows.
Definition 2. By an oriented cycle  I of graph   = fV;Eg where I = (i1; : : : ; is), ik 2
f1; : : : ;mg for k = 1; : : : ; s we call the graph  I = fVI ; EIg with
VI = fVi1 ; : : : ; Visg  V
and
EI = fEi1i2 ; : : : ; Eis 1is ; Eisi1g  E:
An oriented cycle containing selected vertex V0 is called a selected cycle.
Definition 3. By a diﬀerence  1 n  2 of graphs  1 = fV 1; E1g and  2 = fV 2; E2g we call the
connected component of the graph   = fV 1; E1 n E2g which contains the selected vertex V 10 .
Definition 4. By a feedback ring e  of graph   we call the set of all the vertices and all the edges
of   contained in arbitrary oriented cycle of   passing through the selected vertex V0.
Rule 2. Suppose there is a vertex Vk that belongs to an oriented cycle containing the selected
vertex V0. Suppose the mentioned cycle belongs to  o and  s. If there is an edge Eik = (Vi; Vk)
with the tail Vk such that Eik 2 Eo and Eik =2 Es then the graph  s is unstable (Fig. 5).
Fig. 5. Rule 2
This rule yields the restoration of hidden edges (i.e., existing in an objective graph, but not
in a subjective graph) of a subjective graph  s that will be performed according to the step of
the algorithm given in the next section.
Rule 3. If f s nf o 6= ; then  s is unstable (Fig. 6).
Fig. 6. Rule 3
This rule yields the removal of non-existent edges of a subjective graph  s that will be
performed according to the step of the algorithm given in the next section.
Corollary 1. A graph that contains no vertices strongly connected to the selected vertex V0 is
stable.
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5. Graph reduction algorithm
Graph reduction algorithm consists of the two steps.
1. Addition of the edges missing in the subjective graph, but existing in the objective graph.
2. Removal of the edges existing in the subjective graph, but missing in the objective graph.
Remark 1. Note the following important points. First of all, each step, in general, may consist of
a diﬀerent number of operations of addition (removal) of edges performed sequentially. Secondly,
the order of steps in the algorithm in general can aﬀect the outcome (reduced graph). Therefore,
we will implement the steps of the algorithm in a specific order. First, one fully performs the
step of addition of all the possible edges and after that, the step of removal of edges. This will
ensure one obtains the same result when the algorithm is finished.
We now describe in detail the steps of the algorithm.
Let  I be an oriented cycle containing the vertex V0,  I   o,  I   s. By fEI we denote
the set of all the edges of the graph   which do not belong to the cycle  I and whose tails are in
arbitrary vertices of  I . By fVI we denote the set of vertices which are heads of the edges of fEI .
Step 1 (addition). If the graph is unstable according to the Rule 2 then by adding some edges it
can be reduced to the graph c s = fcV s;cEsg;
where cEs = Es [[
I
fEoI n fEsI ; cV s = Es [[
I
fV oI n fV sI  : (1)
Here the union is taken over all multi-indices I for which there exist oriented cycles  I containing
V0 and such that  I   o,  I   s.
Remark 2. If in (1) one uses fEoI instead of fEoI n fEsI and fV oI instead of fV oI n fV sI , the result
remains the same. However, the proposed form is convenient because the given sets are exactly
the sets of new edges and vertices (which are not contained in the previous version of the modified
subjective graph).
Step 2 (removal). If the graph is unstable according to the Rule 3, then by removing some edges
it can be reduced to the graph c s =  s n f s nf o :
1. The main result
The main result of this paper answers the question, "under what conditions can a subjective
graph be reduced to the objective one?"
Theorem 5.1. If the feedback ring of subjective graph contains all its vertices, and the set of
vertices of subjective and objective graphs coincide, then the reduced subjective graph coincides
with the objective graph. This can be written down as
If V o = V s  f s; then c s =  o:
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6. Example of an interpretation of the model
Suppose there is a subject S (in the system) which can initiate the process p1 with parame-
ter x.
The process p1, in turn, starts the process p2 with the parameter y that is generated based
on x.
Process p1 (x: par)
y = func (x);
Create Process p2 (y);
...
end.
The process p2 generates parameter z based on y. After that, the file f1 is open for writing
and the process writes z down to it.
Process p2 (y: par)
z = func (y);
Open f1 for write;
Write z to f1;
...
end.
The subject s can view the contents of the file f1, i.e. he is able to run the command:
Open f1 for read;
k = f1;
As a result, we get the following information flows scheme (Fig. 7).
Fig. 7. Information flows scheme
This scheme can be represented as a graph (objective and/or subjective), see Fig. 8.
Fig. 8. Graph representation of information flows
Here we assume that the subjective graph coincides with the objective one, i.e. assumptions
of the subject S on the information flows structure in the system are true.
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Now let us consider two graphs which are unstable according to the Rules 2 and 3 (Fig. 9
and 10, respectively).
Fig. 9. Unstable graph according to the Rule 2
Fig. 10. Unstable graph according to the Rule 3
In the first case, the process p1 in fact does not initiate the process p2. This leads to the
situation when the subject cannot discover any feedback when aﬀecting the file f1. If there is no
other feedback ring in the graph, he will lose all the objects and information flows in this chain.
In the second case, there is an extra process that has an access for writing to the file f1. This
fact will be discovered by the subject sooner or later so that the new edge will appear in the
subjective graph.
7. Analysis of real systems
Application of the model described above can be considered for information security systems.
Take for example the classical Harrison-Ruzzo-Ullman access matrix model [4] which is considered
in information security models.
The model defines:
O — the set of objects in the system;
S — the set of subjects in the system (S  O);
R — the set of access rights types of subjects to objects;
T — access matrix with rows corresponding to the subjects and columns corresponding to
the objects (T [s; o]  R).
As a result of applying a primitive operator , a transition from the state q = (S;O; T ) to
the state q0 = (S0; O0; T 0) is performed. We denote this transition by q 7! q0.
In our case, it is necessary to introduce the subjective states of the system for all the subjects
of the system
8si 2 S 9qsi = (Ssi ; Osi ; Tsi):
Each subject in the graph defined by the state qsi = (Ssi ; Osi ; Tsi) has an area of misinfor-
mation (fake objects and accesses) and an invisible area (objects and accesses that he does not
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see in the objective access matrix). Denote them as
Misinformation area: qmissi = (Ssi n S;Osi nO; Tsi n T );
Invisible area: qinvsi = (S n Ssi ; O nOsi ; T n Tsi):
Harrison-Ruzzo-Ullman model (HRU) is used for analysis of safe-states of systems depending
on the possibility of a transition to the state q0 for which the forbidden permissions appear in
the respective cells of the matrix.
If we introduce subjective states of the system, the HRU system cannot perform transitions
if they do not exist in the subjective matrices of any of the subjects. Thus we can express initial
state of the system with N subjects as follows:
q0 = (Ss1 [ : : : [ SsN \ S;Os1 [ : : : [OsN \O; Ts1 [ : : : [ TsN \ T ):
Obviously, when intersecting the sets, the system can switch from an unsecure state to a
secure one and vice versa. Consequently, if the system in which only the objective states of
the HRU automaton are being analyzed is unsecure, then it does not mean that we also get
an insecure system starting from subjective states of the HRU automaton. This gives us an
opportunity to obtain a secure system by adjusting subjective access matrices.
In order to reduce analysis of the system to analysis of the information flows, one has to
define graph vertices as objects of the set O. One also needs to introduce a function that
transfers elements of the access matrix to the edges of the graph. For R = fread;write; executeg
it can be done as follows:
  = (V;E); V = O; E = f(v1; v2) jwrite 2 T [o1; o2] or
execute 2 T [o1; o2] or read 2 T [o1; o2]g:
We have to implement this construction both for objective and subjective graphs. As a
result, we will get the objective and the subjective access graphs. This will allow us to answer
the following questions according to the above described theory:
 How can misinformation of the subjects lead them to the stable subjective states?
 What information can be obtained by the subjects based on their access to the objects and
entities of the system (i.e., what graphs can they obtain through the research)?
 In which case can the information security administrator claim that the subjective image
of the system constructed by him corresponds to the objective structure (according to the
Theorem 5.1)?
In order to bring the information flows graph back to the access matrix T 0 of the HRU system,
one has to perform the following transformations:
r 2 T 0[oi; oj ] , r 2 T [oi; oj ] and (vi; vj) 2 E;
where r 2 fread;write; executeg. The result is the modified access matrix of the system, in which
the state can be secure. Thus, by controlling the user perception of the system structure, one
can bring the system from an insecure state to a secure one.
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8. Conclusion and applications
The model of a researcher considered in the present work allows us to make the system secure
by means of user perception about the system and about misinformation to the users. Besides the
Harrison-Ruzzo-Ullman model, one can consider and make similar additions to other information
security models such as the Take-Grant model or mandate and role access control model [5]. The
model can also be used for conflictive systems modeling. For example, it can be used for the
construction of the initial payment matrices in theoretical-game-models.
Mathematical models developed in this work can also be used in the field of software testing
since they allow one to compare the structure of the tested system to the tests with a stable
positive feedback. Based on the developed functional systems research methodology, we can come
to software design patterns, which would avoid uninformative feedback on the testing stage.
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Математическое моделирование информированности
субъектов в системах информационной безопасности
Михаил А.Стюгин
Алексей А.Кытманов
В статье рассмотрена проблема исследования функциональных структур на примере информа-
ционных систем. Особенность такого исследования заключается в том, что не всегда возможно
добиться того, что результат исследования будет соответствовать реальности. Это крайне
актуальная проблема в области разработки и анализа систем информационной безопасности и
анализа программного обеспечения на предмет недекларируемых возможностей. В статье дана
модель исследователя и исследуемого им функционального объекта. На основании данной модели
показаны информационные ограничения исследователя. Построена математическая модель субъ-
ективной структуры исследуемой системы, и показано, в каких случаях она является устойчи-
вой. Дан также ответ на вопрос, в каком случае субъект может утверждать, что его субъ-
ективная функциональная структура объекта соответствует действительной. Приведены при-
меры реализации данного подхода на математических моделях информационной безопасности.
Ключевые слова: математические модели информационной безопасности, модель исследователя,
информационная структура конфликта, информационные потоки, дезинформация, модель черно-
го ящика, теория графов.
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